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Access to Capital and Firm-Level Investment Behavior in Food Industries:  A Comparison 
of Cooperatives and Publicly Traded Firms 
 
Introduction 
Agricultural cooperatives have played an important economic role in the United States.  
They face, however, increasing survival challenges in light of the agroindustrialization process.  
In particular, many scholars suggest that imperfect access to capital is the “Achilles’ heel” of 
farmer-owned cooperatives in an increasingly concentrated and tightly coordinated food system.  
According to this “capital constraint hypothesis,” agricultural cooperatives are unable to acquire 
sufficient risk capital to finance profitable investment opportunities.  In other words, 
cooperatives may be insufficiently capitalized to make the necessary investments to grow and 
remain a viable organizational form. 
The following arguments summarize the theoretical literature and substantiate the claim 
that agricultural cooperatives are financially constrained:  (i) cooperative residual claims are 
restricted; (ii) cooperatives’ vaguely defined property rights structure does not provide members 
incentives to invest; (iii) equity capital acquisition in cooperatives depends on internally 
generated capital; (iv) cooperative equity capital is generally not permanent; and (v) cooperatives 
have limited access to external sources of funds.  Because the pool of potential equity investors 
is restricted to current member-patrons, who have inappropriate incentives to invest due to free 
rider, portfolio and horizon problems, cooperatives are believed to be “equity capital starved” 
(Vitaliano).  In addition, cooperatives may face credit constraints due to informational 
asymmetries, non-permanency of allocated equity capital, and over-reliance on CoBank debt 
capital (Cook).   2
Despite convincing theoretical arguments supporting the cooperative capital constraint 
hypothesis, the empirical evidence is not conclusive.  Two distinct, but related, approaches are 
identified in the empirical literature: growth studies and empirical tests of the cooperative equity 
constraint hypothesis.  Growth studies have found that cooperatives experienced higher growth 
rates than comparable corporations in the 1970s (Chen et al.) and that the long-term growth rate 
of seven large North American cooperatives is not constrained by size, but is “low, perhaps even 
zero” (Fulton et al.).  Several studies conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s suggest that 
cooperatives do not borrow more than comparable investor-owned firms (e.g., Lerman and 
Parliament, Royer, Hind).  However, these empirical studies focus exclusively on the supply of 
capital and, consequently, fail to address a more fundamental question – is the supply of risk 
capital enough to finance the demand for investment funds? 
This study attempts to fill this void in the literature by examining the capital constraint 
hypothesis with an econometric analysis of firm-level investment behavior in food industries.  In 
particular, we examine whether ownership structure differences affect access to capital and, 
consequently, the investment sensitivity to financial variables, particularly cash flow.  In order to 
do so, we collect comparable accounting data from two sets of firms with operations in food 
industries – agricultural cooperatives and publicly traded firms – for the years 1991 through 
2000.  Comparing investment behavior between cooperatives and public corporations in the 
same industry is informative because, a priori, public corporations are generally not financially 
constrained as they have unrestricted residual claims and access to public equity markets.  
Stronger sensitivity of investment to cash flow, therefore, is expected in cooperatives.  The next 
section lays out the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of firm investment decisions 
in U.S. food industries.   3
Theoretical Framework: The Q Investment Model 
The roots of the Q theory of investment are commonly traced to the pioneering work of 
James Tobin.  According to Tobin, firm investment opportunities are summarized by the market 
value of its capital stock.  In particular, firm investment expenditures are positively related to 
average q – also known as Tobin’s q – defined as the ratio of the financial value of the firm (Vt) 
to the replacement cost of its existing capital stock, 
(1) Qt
A = Vt / pt Kt, 
where pt is the relative price of investment goods to the price of output and Kt is the capital stock 
at time t. 
Subsequent theoretical work shows that the adjustment cost technology and firm value 
maximizing behavior lead to a positive correlation between investment and marginal q (Lucas 
and Prescott).  Marginal q is defined as the expected present value of future profits from 
additional investment – that is, the “shadow price” of capital.  Let profits for firm i at any time t 
(Πit) be determined by its capital stock (Kit) and a stochastic variable (σit), assuming all other 
production inputs are “maximized out” in that they are already utilized at their optimum levels.
1  
Assume further that capital is a quasi-fixed input such that net increments to the firm’s capital 
stock are subject to adjustment costs represented by the convex function C(Iit, Kit, τit).  
Adjustment costs are usually assumed to be increasing in investment (Iit), decreasing in capital 
(Kit), and also affected by exogenous technology shocks (τit).  In addition, the firm’s existing 
capital stock is a function of previous investment expenditures, which introduces the capital 
accumulation constraint 
                                                 
1 This derivation of the Q model is based on Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Hubbard (1998).   4
(2) Kit = Iit + (1 – δi) Ki,t-1,  
where δi represents the firm’s constant rate of capital depreciation. 
The firm’s optimization problem is thus to choose investment to maximize its market 
value 
(3)  () ( )
s
it it i is is is is is s is
st




=β Π σ − τ −   
 ∑ , 
subject to the capital accumulation constraint  (2).  Eit is the expectations operator with a 
subscript indicating the information available to the i
th firm at time t; and 
s
i β  is the discount 
factor adopted by the i
th firm.  New capital resulting from investment is expected to become 
productive within the year.  The first-order condition of this maximization problem yields the 
marginal q specification 
(4) pt
 + CI(Iit, Kit, τit) = qit, 
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The right-hand side in equation (4) is marginal q, which is defined in equation (5) as the 
expected discounted value of profits from new capital investment.  The intuition is that the firm 
maximizes its market value by equating the marginal benefits of an additional dollar of 
investment (marginal q) to the concomitant marginal costs given by the price of investment and 
the marginal adjustment cost.  To obtain an estimable specification for the Q investment 
equation, a functional form for the adjustment cost function, C, must be introduced.  The 
tradition in the Q theory literature is to follow Hayashi and to specify C as 
                                                   5
(6) C(Iit, Kit,τit) = (α/2) [Iit/Kit – ai – τit]
2 Kit, 
where α is the slope of the adjustment cost function and ai represents a firm-specific effect.  Note 
that α affects the speed with which investment responds to exogenous shocks.  Partially 
differentiating equation (6) with respect to investment, substituting the resulting CI(Iit, Kit,τit) into 
equation (4) and solving for Iit/Kit yields the investment equation 
(7) Iit/Kit = ai + (1/α) qit + τit + εit, 
where εit is an optimization error.  Therefore, under the conditions assumed by the Q theory, 
investment should be solely determined by contemporaneous marginal q.  It is important, 
however, to note that this specification of the investment equation is a representation of a model 
under frictionless capital markets that should explain investment for firms with low premium in 
the cost of external relative to internal financing. 
Since marginal q is unobservable, Tobin’s average q is commonly used as a proxy 
variable in empirical studies based on the Q theory of investment.  However, Tobin’s q 
constructed from financial market data is only an appropriate measure of marginal q under 
certain conditions – including competitive product and factor markets, homogeneity of fixed 
capital, linearly homogeneous production and adjustment cost technologies, and independent 
investment and financing decisions (Hayashi).  Under these conditions, the value of the firm 
equals the rents from existing capital stock.  As a result, the empirical Q investment model is 
commonly represented by 
(8) Iit/Kit = ai + b Qit + τit + εit, 
where b = (1/α) and Qit is the tax-adjusted value of Tobin’s q.  In his survey of the empirical 
investment literature following the advent of the Q theory, Chirinko observes that equation (8) is 
the most popular explicit model of firm investment behavior, but the model’s empirical   6
performance has been unsatisfactory both in terms of the statistical significance of marginal q 
and the model’s overall explanatory power.  In addition, the estimated coefficient for marginal q 
is in general too low, translating into an unrealistically high adjustment cost parameter (α).  More 
importantly, variables such as liquidity and output are consistently found to be statistically 
significant when included in the Q investment model specification.  The role of liquidity – that 
is, financial constraints – in firm investment behavior is explored in the next section. 
Previous Empirical Studies of Financial Constraints 
The influential applied work by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen is at the roots of an 
extensive empirical literature examining the consequences of informational imperfections in 
financial markets on the firm’s investment decision.  The analytical underpinning of these 
contemporary models of capital market imperfections is found in economic models relaxing the 
neoclassical perfect information assumption.  This school of thought is known as the Economics 
of Information, which recognizes “that information is imperfect, that obtaining information can 
be costly, that there are important asymmetries of information, and that the extent of information 
asymmetries is affected by actions of firms and individuals” (Stiglitz, p. 1441). 
The introduction of information problems in formal economic models has important 
ramifications to the study of capital markets and the theory of finance.  In their study of credit 
markets with information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, Stiglitz and Weiss show 
that an increase in the interest rate charged by a lender causes borrowers to increase the average 
risk of their investment projects.  In doing so, the resulting increased overall risk of the lender’s 
loan portfolio may outweigh the gains from a higher interest rate.  Consequently, the lender may 
maximize profits by simply restricting the supply of loans to borrowers leading to excess demand 
in credit markets.  In light of this result, Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (p. 194) argue, “many   7
firms face credit constraints; thus it is the availability of credit, not the price which they have to 
pay, which restricts their investment.” 
The effects of information problems on equity markets are analyzed by Myers and 
Majluf.  The authors show that asymmetric information between managers and investors 
regarding the profitability of a new investment project causes conflicts of interest between 
existing shareholders and potential providers of new investment finance.  This potential conflict 
of interest is not relevant if the firm generates enough internal funds to finance the new project 
investment.  However, if the proposed project requires access to external finance, the firm may 
forego positive net present value projects as a result of these conflicts of interest.  Under these 
circumstances, the firm’s investment and financing decisions are interdependent.  Because of the 
differential costs of internal and external sources of finance, Myers and Majluf propose a 
“pecking order” theory of corporate finance. 
The general implication of theoretical studies in the Economics of Information tradition is 
that the presence of information problems in capital markets leads to a cost wedge between 
external finance and internally generated funds.  Hubbard shows the supply curve of finance is a 
horizontal segment up to the firm’s total net worth (W0) but is upward-sloping beyond W0 as the 
firm needs to access external funds to finance investment projects.  Furthermore, the slope of the 
supply curve of finance is proportional to the marginal information costs between the firm and 
suppliers of external funds.  In other words, “in the presence of incentive problems and costly 
monitoring of managerial actions, external suppliers of funds to firms require a higher return to 
compensate them for these monitoring costs and the potential moral hazard associated with 
managers’ control over the allocation of investment funds” (pp. 194-5).  In addition, holding 
information costs constant, an increase in net worth causes a shift of the supply of funds schedule   8
to the right.  This finding provides a theoretical underpinning to the inclusion of proxy variables 
for changes in net worth (e.g., cash flow) in the standard Q investment equation. 
Additionally, firm characteristics – such as size, dividend policy, leverage, and close 
relationship with bankers, among others – may be a source of firm heterogeneity with respect to 
information costs.  When firms face negligible information costs, an increase in net worth 
independent of changes in investment opportunities has no effect on investment.  For firms 
facing high information costs, however, an increase in net worth leads to greater investment 
(Hubbard).  As a result, financial constraints are hypothesized to be more severe – and the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow more pronounced – for “high information cost” firms when 
compared to “low information cost” firms. 
A variety of empirical applications are based on the analytical underpinnings offered by 
the Economics of Information School, including applied studies investigating the relationship 
between capital constraints and firm investment.  Empirical studies of capital market 
imperfections affecting firm investment behavior examine firm-level panel data in which firms 
are grouped into “high information cost” and “low information cost” categories.  This tradition 
dates back to Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, who use a large panel of U.S. manufacturing firms 
to analyze the interdependence of investment and financing decisions.  The authors identify 
“high information cost” firms on the basis of a priori information on observed net income 
retention practices.  They hypothesize, “if the cost disadvantage of external finance is large, it 
should have the greatest effect on firms that retain most of their income” (p. 158).  They test this 
theoretical proposition by estimating a Q investment equation with cash flow as a proxy for net 
worth.  Their empirical results consistently indicate a substantially greater sensitivity of   9
investment to cash flow in firms with a high net income retention rate.  The authors conclude that 
financial effects are important determinants of corporate investment. 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein examine the interdependence of financing and 
investment decisions in a sample of Japanese firms.  The authors distinguish firms in the sample 
on the basis of membership in a keiretsu – i.e., Japanese industrial groups with direct links to 
large banks.  They suggest that firms belonging to a keiretsu are “low information cost” as a 
result of attenuated information asymmetries with providers of finance.  In contrast, independent 
firms are expected to face greater costs when raising external funds.  This proposition is 
examined following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen’s strategy of adding a cash flow variable in 
the Q investment equation.  Empirical results support the fact that investment by firms with a 
close relationship with a bank is less sensitive to cash flow than independent firms. 
Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli estimate the expanded Q model of 
investment for a panel of 532 U.K. manufacturing companies over the period 1975-86.  Their 
empirical results suggest that average q is a significant factor in the explanation of corporate 
investment, but its effect is small.  In addition to average q, they find cash flow and output 
variables significantly affect corporate investment.  The results indicate that U.K. corporations 
may be financially constrained, but the authors do not explore the firm heterogeneity in the 
sample. 
Schaller studies the role of financial constraints in the investment behavior of a sample of 
212 Canadian firms.  The author explores the effects of firm age as an alternative a priori 
criterion to separate “low information cost” from “high information cost” firms.  He argues that 
“mature” firms may face lower information costs when accessing external sources of finance 
than “young, liquidity constrained” firms.  The empirical results suggest that young firms pay a   10
higher price for new equity financing than mature firms and their investment spending is more 
sensitive to cash flow. 
In addition to the Q theory of investment, the Euler equation approach also serves as the 
basis for empirical studies of financial constraints resulting from imperfect capital markets.  For 
example, Whited includes the effect of a debt constraint in the Euler equation of investment and 
observes that this “greatly improves” the Euler equation’s performance in comparison to the 
standard specification.  According to Whited (p. 1451), “the evidence suggests that difficulties in 
obtaining debt finance have an impact on investment.”  The author also examines two different 
measures of financial distress as a priori criteria to distinguish financially constrained from non-
constrained firms.  Regression results based on a large panel of U.S. corporations indicate the 
unconstrained Euler equation is violated for firms likely to face binding debt constraints, whereas 
it is not rejected for unconstrained firms. 
Bond and Meghir use a panel of 626 U.K. companies to estimate dynamic investment 
models based on the Euler equation.  Unconstrained firms are identified by the payment of 
positive dividends and the issue of zero new shares in two successive periods.  The authors find 
that the standard specification of the Euler equation model applies only to firms that are a priori 
financially unconstrained.  However, “a persistent result is that current investment is positively 
related to lagged cash flow,” which suggests some firms in the sample are financially constrained 
(p. 216). 
Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited use an estimation strategy based on the Euler equation 
representation of the firm’s investment behavior to analyze firm-level panel data collected from 
Compustat.  The chosen sample split procedure is based on dividend payout rates, with “high 
payout” firms hypothesized to be less financially constrained than “low payout” firms.  The   11
authors are unable to reject the standard frictionless investment model for firms with high 
dividend payouts, but the model is “easily” rejected for firms deemed a priori to be financially 
constrained. 
A significant breakthrough in the applied literature testing for the existence of capital 
market imperfections is provided by Gilchrist and Himmelberg.  In particular, the authors 
propose an alternative proxy variable to measure firm investment opportunities instead of 
Tobin’s average q.  Their alternative measure of marginal q is “Fundamental q” as it is based on 
observed firm fundamentals, including sales and cash flow.  More specifically, they estimate a 
set of vector autoregression (VAR) forecasting equations based on the firm’s fundamentals and 
use the estimates from the VAR system to construct marginal q.  They estimate the Q model of 
investment with both Tobin’s q and Fundamental q using firm-level panel data collected from 
470 U.S. manufacturing firms.  When comparing the results from estimating the benchmark 
investment model using Tobin’s q versus Fundamental q, the authors find that “Fundamental q 
provides very plausible estimates of adjustment costs and implied speeds of adjustment” (p. 
566).  In contrast, Tobin’s q is a poor proxy of investment opportunities and tends to overstate 
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, especially for unconstrained firms. 
After establishing the validity of the Fundamental q approach, the authors examine the 
role of cash flow in the augmented Q investment equation.  They investigate three alternative 
sample splits to discern financially constrained from unconstrained firms in the sample: dividend 
policy, firm size and participation in public debt markets.  Regression results show that large 
firms and firms with access to public debt markets are not financially constrained, but small 
firms with no bond rating or a commercial paper program are found to have excess sensitivity of   12
investment to cash flow.  However, low dividend payout firms do not show a higher cash flow 
coefficient as compared to high dividend payout firms. 
The importance of Gilchrist and Himmelberg’s work – in particular, the Fundamental q 
approach to measuring investment demand – is twofold.  First, it appears to be a better proxy for 
marginal q than Tobin’s q, as it does not rely on the conditions set forth by Hayashi.  Second, 
with Fundamental q as a measure of marginal q, the Q model of investment can be estimated for 
nonpublic firms for which market data is not available.  Based on the Fundamental q approach, 
Bierlen estimates Q machinery investment equations for a sample of 395 Kansas farms during 
the period 1973-92.  The investment equations are estimated for two asset sizes and three six-
year time regimes.  Empirical results suggest that cash flow and sales are significant 
determinants of farmers’ investment behavior. In addition, larger farmers suffer from less credit 
rationing than smaller farmers and credit rationing becomes more intense during the 1981-86 
agricultural credit crisis.  The author concludes that the Q theory results support the 
interdependence of financial and investment decision-making in Kansas’s agriculture. 
Bierlen and Featherstone use 1976-92 data from 405 Kansas commercial farms and find 
that debt level is the strongest determinant of credit constraints.  In particular, the investment-
cash flow coefficient is more pronounced for high-debt farms, especially during the 1980s credit 
crisis.  In addition, the authors observe that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is also 
more severe in young-operator and small-size farms.  They suggest, “an option to increase the 
financial stability of young [farmers] is to shift some of their risk to other parties through outside 
equity” (p. 434). 
Another applied study of financial constraints in the U.S. farm sector based on the 
Fundamental q approach is found in Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor.  Their empirical test of farm   13
credit constraints is based on a sample of 118 Illinois farms over the period 1987-94.  The 
findings from regression analysis lend further support to the hypothesis that U.S. farmers face 
binding financial constraints when making investment decisions.  Additionally, the authors use 
two alternative sample splitting criteria to group farms in “low information cost” and “high 
information cost” categories: age of farmer and application of a credit scoring model developed 
by researchers at the University of Illinois.  Contrary to the authors’ expectations, older farmers 
are found to be more credit constrained than younger farmers.  However, the result for the credit 
scored groups are consistent with the hypothesis that “high information cost” farmers are more 
financially constrained than “low information cost” farmers. 
More recently, Benjamin and Phimister examine whether differences in the structure of 
farm credit markets in France and the U.K. affect the sensitivity of investment to financial 
variables.  Whereas in France the vast majority of funds to farmers is provided by a cooperative 
bank (Credit Agricole), non-specialist commercial banks dominate agricultural credit markets in 
the U.K.  Based on a sample of 446 U.K. farms and 331 French farms, the authors estimate Euler 
equation, and inventory and machinery investment models.  Empirical results indicate that there 
were sharp differences in the pattern of investment sensitivity to cash flow depending on the 
amount and quality of collateral available. 
After reviewing the extensive applied literature examining the effects of capital market 
imperfections on firm investment behavior, Hubbard (p. 193) outline the principal findings of 
these studies: “(1) all else being equal, investment is significantly correlated with proxies for 
changes in net worth or internal funds; and (2) that correlation is most important for firms likely 
to face information related capital-market imperfections.”  In addition to facing information 
asymmetries with lenders, agricultural cooperatives are characterized by restricted residual   14
claims.  Taken together, these arguments suggest that cooperatives are likely to face financial 
constraints when making investment decisions.  In contrast, the unrestricted residual claim 
characteristic of common stock is the most effective means of “generating large amounts of 
wealth from residual claimants on a permanent basis” in order to finance organization specific 
assets (Fama and Jensen, p. 312).  It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that publicly traded firms 
be a priori financially unconstrained.  The following section investigates the investment 
behavior of cooperatives and publicly traded corporations in the food industry. 
Econometric Model and Data 
In this section we introduce the empirical model used to investigate the interdependence 
of financing and investment decisions in the U.S. food industry.  A panel data set allows 
comparing agricultural cooperatives and publicly traded corporations and testing the hypothesis 
that cooperatives are more financially constrained.  The employed econometric model follows 
the Q theory of investment and specifically the fundamental q approach of Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg.  The investment equation is given by 
(9)  it it i t it it
1
Iq C F =+ η + ν + β + ε
α
 
where α is the slope of the adjustment cost function, q is marginal q, ηi and νt are firm and time 
specific effects, respectively, CFit is cash flow, and εit a random error.  Under the condition of 
perfect capital access, we would expect that cash flow does not have an influence on investment, 
i.e. β = 0. 
The marginal profitability of capital or marginal q, a measure of investment demand, is 
constructed from the estimates of a bivariate vector autoregressive  (VAR) system using a vector 
of firm fundamentals (xit) that includes cash flow, as previously defined (CFit/Kit), and the ratio 
of sales and lagged values thereof:   15
(10)  it it 1 i t it fdu − =+ + + xA x  
Note that the inclusion of lagged values in xit in (10) implies a VAR of higher order than 
one.  Employing a projection of future profits based on the coefficients of the VAR A, 
(11) qit = [c’ (I – λA)]
-1 xit, 
where xit is a vector containing cash flow as the j
th element, c is a conformable vector of zeros 
with a 1 in the j
th row, I is the identity matrix, λ is a constant representing the sum of the 
discount factor and depreciation rate.  This allows substituting qit in (9) with the right hand side 
of (11). 
Following Bierlen and Featherstone, the modified investment equation (9) and the VAR 
in (10) are estimated simultaneously using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
accommodating heteroskedastic errors and endogeneity in the model.  The instrument set 
includes lagged values of firm fundamentals such as net worth, net income, and depreciation.  
We note that any lagged values of the explanatory variables beyond the first lag are valid 
instruments (Griliches and Hausman).  For estimation purposes all variables are first-differenced 
in order to eliminate fixed-firm effects (Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen). 
Empirical testing of the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis is based on a firm-level 
panel data set of U.S. agricultural cooperatives.  The data set was obtained from CoBank, a 
financial services organization that collected and standardized the financial data for all 
cooperative firms included in the sample.  In addition to the cooperative data, we collect 
comparable financial data from publicly traded firms with operations in the food industry from 
Compustat.  This approach ensures accurate comparisons among cross-sectional units throughout 
the study period.  The cooperatives and corporations in the sample produce audited annual 
financial reports certified by a CPA firm and prepared under Generally Accepted Accounting   16
Principles (GAAP), which contributes to the quality and integrity of the data set.  The original 
data set contains annual accounting information from 131 agricultural cooperatives and 227 
corporations comprising the years 1991 through 2000. 
The construction of the variables included in the investment model is conducted as 
follows: 
a) Investment (Iit) is defined as capital expenditures for the construction and acquisition 
of physical assets (property, plant and equipment).  Data on agricultural cooperatives’ capital 
expenditures are not available.  As a result, investment is measured from changes in physical 
assets between subsequent years.  This study follows Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein and 
measures cooperative investment as the change in the stock of depreciable capital (net fixed 
assets) from the previous year plus capital depreciation during the year. 
b) Cash flow (CFit) in corporations is obtained by adding non-cash cost items, such as 
depreciation and amortization, to income after interest and taxes and before extraordinary items 
(net income).  In the computation of agricultural cooperative cash flow, it is not only important 
to distinguish between cash and non-cash items, but also to recognize sources and uses of cash 
that are unique to cooperative organizations.  This study computes cooperative cash flow as the 
sum of net income, depreciation and amortization, but deducts non-cash patronage income, 
patronage dividends paid in cash, net retirements of allocated equity (including retains revolved), 
gains or losses on asset sales, and after-tax extraordinary items from cooperative net income. 
c) Normalization by capital stock.  In the construction of variables, investment, cash 
flow, and instrumental variables are first deflated by the CPI.  Subsequently, the variables are 
normalized by the firm’s capital stock in the beginning of the year to eliminate scale effects and   17
to lower heteroskedasticity across firms in the sample.  Following Kaplan and Zingales, capital 
stock is measured as the book value of property, plant and equipment (i.e., net fixed assets). 
Given the order of the VAR and the lags involved in constructing model variables, the 
initial 5 years of the panel cannot be used in estimating the investment model.  The investment 
model is, therefore, estimated for the years 1996-2000.  It is a common practice in the empirical 
investment literature to exclude from the sample firms with extreme values of investment, cash 
flow, sales or other variables of interest.  The model can be sensitive to outliers, especially if 
firms have very low capital stock, which is used to normalize the variables in the model.  We 
have applied outlier rules to the data and deleted outlier observations if they fall in the one 
percent tails of the respective variable’s distribution. 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics: Median Values of Variables, 1996-2000 
Variable Corporations  Cooperatives 
Total Assets ($ million)  330.66  29.78 
Net Worth ($ million)  144.00  11.70 
Capital Stock ($ million)  143.08  12.01 
Investment ($ million)  14.14  1.09 
Cash Flow ($ million)  30.09  1.55 
Sales ($ million)  488.91  76.51 
I/K 0.14  0.12 
CFL/K 0.28  0.17 
S/K 3.84  5.99 
Equity to Asset Ratio  0.45  0.41 
Leverage 1.24  1.41 
Permanent Equity  0.97  0.15 
Unallocated Retained Earnings  0.66  0.11 
N 435  431 
 
Summary statistics for the firm-level panel is shown in Table 1.  The corporations in the 
sample are larger than the cooperatives in terms of assets, net worth, capital stock, and sales.  
They also invest relatively more and generate more cash flows.  Corporations are less leveraged   18
and have higher median equity-to-asset ratio than cooperatives.  In addition, 97 percent of 
corporate net worth is permanent while cooperatives rely more heavily on redeemable sources of 
equity capital.  Note that unallocated retained earnings represent only 11 percent of cooperative 
total net worth. 
Empirical Results 
The model introduced above was estimated for corporations and cooperatives separately 
imposing the cross equation restrictions implied by the projection of marginal q on firm 
fundamentals.  A pooled regression across corporations and cooperatives was rejected at the 5 
percent significance level using an appropriate Wald test.  Regression results for the two relevant 
coefficients in the investment equation estimates are shown in Table 2.  Results are based on the 
following instruments: lagged values 2 to 4 of cash flow and sales as well as net worth, net 
income and depreciation.  Similarly to the explanatory variables in the investment model, 
instrumental variables are first deflated by the CPI and then normalized by the lag of net 
property, plant and equipment, a proxy for fixed capital. 
Table 2: Estimation Results for Investment Equation
   Corporations Cooperatives 
  Cash Flow Augmented Model 
Alpha (Q)  0.328 (0.057)  0.668 (0.167) 
Beta (Cash Flow)  -0.547 (0.483)  0.608 (0.022) 
  Model Without Cash Flow 
Alpha (Q)  0.454 (0.000)  0.252 (0.092) 
Note: P-values in parentheses 
 
First we discuss the results of the model augmented with the cash flow variable.  Both 
types of firms respond positively to marginal q as indicated by the sign of the coefficient alpha.  
In other words, food industry cooperatives and corporations invest more when the demand for   19
capital measured by marginal q is larger.  The adjustment cost parameter (alpha) is lower for 
corporations compared to cooperatives which would imply that corporations react more quickly 
with investment to exogenous shocks than their cooperative counterparts.  The P-value of the 
alpha estimate for the cooperative sub-sample is such that a statistical significant influence 
would be rejected at the 10 percent confidence level.  Consequently, the data do not show 
marginal q to be a strong determinant of investment in the case of cooperatives.  This finding, 
however, should be interpreted carefully given remaining uncertainties with respect to the 
measurement of marginal q in this specific empirical application. 
Cash flow does have a significant influence on investment for cooperatives beyond the 
indirect influence on marginal q, but not for the case of corporations.  In other words, the 
evidence suggests that cooperatives are financially constrained, whereas corporations are not.  
Therefore, our comparison of the investment behavior of cooperatives versus corporations 
provides support to the capital constraint hypothesis for cooperatives laid out in the introduction 
of this paper. 
Given that the influence of cash flow is not statistically significant for corporations, we 
set beta equal to zero and re-estimate the model for corporations (Table 2).  We observe that 
alpha is still positive and significant but larger than in the augmented model.  Nevertheless, it 
still implies a quicker reaction of corporations to changing environments than the estimated 
alpha for cooperatives in the relevant augmented model.  Just for information, we also report the 
estimate of alpha for model without cash flow for cooperatives.  The substantially different 
coefficient would lead the analyst who just looks at this model to falsely believe that marginal q 
is a statistically significant and highly relevant determinant of investment.  It is a reminder that 
the model with only marginal q is relevant only in the absence of capital constraints.   20
Summary and Policy Implications 
It is commonly argued in the literature that agricultural cooperatives are financially 
constrained because they are unable to acquire sufficient risk capital to invest.  In this research 
we addressed the issue of capital constraints and examined the investment behavior of 
agricultural cooperatives and publicly traded corporations in the food industry.  Empirical results 
lend support to the hypothesis that agricultural cooperatives are financially constrained.  The 
augmented Q model adds explanatory power to cooperative physical capital investment when 
compared to the restricted model without cash flow.  In addition, the cash flow coefficient is not 
statistically significant for a comparable sample of corporations.  The fact that cooperative 
investment is significantly sensitive to cash flow suggests the presence of capital constraints in 
the cooperative sample. 
These results have important implications to private and public policy regarding 
agricultural cooperatives.  Investment constraints arise in agricultural cooperatives as a result of 
free rider, horizon, and portfolio problems, which in turn emerge because residual claims are 
restricted to members, non-transferable, redeemable, and with benefit distribution proportional to 
usage rather than shareholdings.  If cooperatives are to remain a viable organizational form in the 
U.S. food industry, their leaders might need to relax restrictions on residual claims with some 
form of organizational change.  In addition to restrictions on residual claims, limited access to 
external sources of funds was also identified as a potential determinant of financial constraints.  
The finding that cooperatives are constrained by capital availability when making investment 
decisions suggests a role for public policy in ensuring cooperatives have adequate access to 
capital markets, particularly to additional sources of equity capital.  Public policy makers should   21
also attempt to eliminate some regulatory restrictions to cooperative organizational change if the 
objective is to mitigate cooperative financial constraints. 
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